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Abstract 
This chapter explores the influence of Harold Garfinkel and the approach to studying social 
action known as ethnomethodology. The chapter explores the distinct approach to studying 
organizing ‘as it happens’ developed by ethnomethodologists. We identify the differences 
between ethnomethodological approaches and mainstream structural-functionalist sociology 
and also identify the methodological concerns and requirements this approach brings with it. 
We conclude by identifying fruitful lines of enquiry for future research in management and 
organizational settings. 
Keywords: Garfinkel, ethnomethodology, reflexivity, indexicality, documentary method of 
interpretation. 
Chapter objectives 
The chapter discusses: 
 The emergence of ethnomethodology as a distinct paradigm of sociological inquiry. 
 The relationship between ethnomethodology and mainstream structural-functionalist 
sociology.  
 Some key concepts in ethnomethodology, including reflexivity, indexicality and the 
documentary method of interpretation. 
 The approach to studying organizing ‘as it happens’ that is adopted by 
ethnomethodologists. 
 An illustration of the ethnomethodological approach to studying organizations by 
Lawrence Wieder. 
 Reflections on the methodological concerns and requirements of an 
ethnomethodological approach to organization studies. 
 Directions of future research in business, management and organizational settings. 
Introduction 
What is ethnomethodology? The term ethnomethodology can easily be misunderstood because 
it sounds like it might refer to a type of research methodology. Despite its name, 
ethnomethodology is not a methodology for doing research – although it does have implications 
for the methodology used and requires observation (and ideally if possible and practical some 
kind of recording) of naturally occurring social settings, for reasons we will go on to explain. 
‘Ethno’ means ‘people’, ‘race’ or ‘culture’ and ‘methodology’ refers to the set of methods or 
procedures that competent members of the social group in question use to go about organizing 
themselves by producing a shared social reality that is factual and objective to them. Put simply, 
then, ethnomethodology is the study of the practical methods through which members of a 
particular social group accomplish social organization.  
 
Ethnomethodology is a distinct paradigm of enquiry in social science because it does not seek 
to provide the kind of second-order social scientific theory of how social order is generated 
provided by other theories. These theories typically attempt to identify the cause-and-effect 
relationships (or other kinds of dependencies) between different social variables (Button, 
1991). Ethnomethodology does not view the academic sociologist as having a ‘superior’ (i.e. 
more sophisticated or complete) way of understanding and explaining the social world and 
hence, on this basis, seek to supplement or enhance member’s own understandings and 
explanations with their own academic theories. “Ethnomethodology doesn't fit in with other 
people's conception of sociology. It was never meant to.” (Sharrock, 1989: 661) For Garfinkel 
(2002), “the worldwide social science movement” uses formal-analytic sociological methods 
in order to study society thereby ignoring “the enacted, unmediated, directly and immediately 
witnessable details of immortal ordinary society” (p.97). Ethnomethodology recognises that 
the people they study are themselves sociologists. They are ‘folk’ sociologists (Wieder, 1974) 
or ‘practical’ sociologists (Benson & Hughes, 1983) who use their own common-sense 
knowledge of the social realm to constitute the social world through their interactions. For 
ethnomethodology, the work of the sociologist is not inherently different from the work of the 
member living their life in the everyday (Zimmerman & Pollner, 1970). 
 
Ethnomethodologists are interested in explicating the methods used by these ‘practical 
sociologists’ they study because it is their social knowledge and reasoning that constitutes the 
social reality used in real-world settings and is therefore consequential for what happens within 
them (Garfinkel, 1967). For example, if we want to understand how and why particular 
decisions get made in the criminal justice system, which have very real material consequences 
for those involved (who gets arrested and charged for a crime, or who gets sentenced or 
acquitted in court), we would first need to understand the forms of sensemaking and reasoning 
used in these settings to make these decisions. Early ethnomethodological studies of policing 
and judicial settings have done precisely this (Sudnow, 1965; Garfinkel, 1967: Chapter 4; 
Cicourel, 1968; Meehan, 1986; Pollner, 1987: Chapter 2). The point of an ethnomethodological 
study is not for the analyst to decide which version of social reality is ‘real’ and ‘true’ – 
something often referred to as ‘ethnomethodological indifference’ (Garfinkel & Rawls, 2002: 
170). For example, if studying a courtroom and seeing the two different versions of reality put 
forward by the prosecution and defence, the aim would not be to decide which is ‘correct’ or 
evaluate whether the judge or jury got their decision ‘right’. Rather, the point is to identify how 
(i.e. through what methods) a group of people (in this case judges and juries) produce what 
they take to be social reality (Travers & Manzo, 2016; Winiecki, 2008; Dingwall, 2000).  
 
In this chapter we will first discuss ethnomethodology’s approach to the study of social order. 
This is followed by a discussion of some core concepts in ethnomethodology, including 
indexicality, reflexivity and the documentary method of interpretation. We then discuss the 
implications of adopting an ethnomethodological approach to the study of management and 
organization for the kinds of research methods that can (and should) be used. We go on to give 
an illustration of how an ethnomethodological approach studies organization by discussing 
Lawrence Wieder’s study of the ‘convict code’ in a halfway house for the rehabilitation of 
prisoners on release. Finally, we conclude by outlining some potential avenues for future 
studies in the management and organization field.  
 
Harold Garfinkel 
Harold Garfinkel was born on 29th of October 1917 in Newark, New Jersey. His father, 
Abraham Garfinkel was a furniture dealer and a member of the large Jewish community in 
Newark. In 1935, during the Great Depression, Harold studied business and accounting at the 
University of Newark and worked in his father’s furniture business in the evenings (vom Lehn, 
2014). According to Garfinkel, his study of accounting practices was more influential on his 
work on everyday accounts than the theories of L Wittgenstein, C W Mills and K Burke, some 
of his contemporaries (Rawls, 2002). Garfinkel went on to study an MA in Sociology at the 
University of North Carolina in 1942. His dissertation examined the methods through which 
inter-racial and intra-racial homicides were managed by the court system (Llewellyn, 2014). 
Garfinkel’s war service for the US Air Force saw him assigned to an army hospital and training 
soldiers in Miami Beach for combat duties, amongst other things training the troops to fight 
tanks with small arms fire (Llewellyn, 2014; vom Lehn, 2014). After the war he studied under 
Talcott Parsons and completed his PhD in 1952 at Harvard. With the help of Philip Selznick, 
Garfinkel got his Assistant Professorship at UCLA in 1954. In 1967, Garfinkel published the 
now-classic book Studies in Ethnomethodology, which let to contentious, sometimes hostile 
commentary and debate. Garfinkel spent the rest of his academic career at UCLA until his 
retirement in 1987. He died on 21st April 2011. 
 
Ethnomethodology and the study of social order 
Garfinkel was certainly one of the most original – and controversial – thinkers in sociology. 
The publication of his book in 1967, Studies in Ethnomethodology, divided academic opinion 
(Llewellyn, 2014). Ethnomethodology emerged as a critique of the structural functionalist 
sociology of Talcott Parsons (Parsons, 1937; 1951) – under whom Garfinkel studied at Harvard 
University in the 1940s. Functionalism was first popularised by Emile Durkheim (1964 [1895]; 
2008 [1912]) and sought to identify the social structures, variables and forces that are 
understood within the functionalist theory to create social order. The term ‘social order’ refers 
to any kind of cooperative, predictable and stable set of social relations that exhibit some kind 
of orderliness (Parsons, 1937). It could refer to the division of roles within a whole society or 
the more local orderliness of a line of people forming a queue (Sharrock, 1995: 4). Structural-
functionalists see shared values as a kind of ‘glue’ that binds society together (Parsons, 1937, 
1951). It is thought to ensure that people cooperate with each other because they have shared 
goals, roles, expectations and norms that can guide their behaviour, thereby generating social 
solidarity and helping to avoid social conflict. The internalisation of common values, according 
to structural-functionalism, explains everything from the ‘macro’ social order of a class 
structure to the ‘micro’ social order of people forming an orderly queue to buy goods in a shop. 
Indeed, Durkheimian (1964 [1895]) functionalism had started with the idea that these shared 
values, norms and rules are pre-existing “social facts” – they exist ‘out there’ in the social realm 
and have a constraining power over people’s behaviour. 
 
Ethnomethodology attempts to rethink the fundamental premise of functionalist and structural-
functionalist sociology that was at the time, and still is, the mainstream explanation of social 
order. Ethnomethodology instead takes these supposedly external ‘constraints’ and instead 
treats them as endogenous accomplishments of knowledgeable members of a social group 
(Leiter, 1980; Handel, 1982; Button, 1991; Coulon, 1995; Francis & Hester, 2004; ten Have, 
2004). In other words, what structural-functionalist sociologists take as pre-given external 
social ‘facts’ and ‘forces’ that make members of a social group ‘orderly’ and ‘organized’, 
ethnomethodology takes as things that people have to produce in an ongoing social process. 
Ethnomethodology is the term that the field’s founding thinker Harold Garfinkel used to 
describe the study of “the work of fact production in flight” (Garfinkel, 1967: 79, emphasis 
added). 
 
From its inception, ethnomethodology was never a unified field (Maynard and Clayman, 1991). 
Even today it is best described as a splintered set of related sub-fields (Button, 1991). One of 
the most significant relationships is that between ethnomethodology (EM) and conversation 
analysis (CA), the latter field emerging from the work of Harvey Sacks. Some people use the 
term EM/CA to highlight this link (Llewellyn & Hindmarsh, 2010). Technically, 
ethnomethodology is not a ‘social theory’ in the traditional sense of the term because it also 
rejects the traditional ways of ‘theorizing’ about matters of social order and organization in 
mainstream social science (vom Lehn, 2016: 52). Rather than being regarded as a ‘social 
theory’ it is often regarded as a distinct paradigm of sociological inquiry in its own right. It is 
distinct because it seeks to ‘re-specify’ the issues, topics and concepts of mainstream social 
science (Button, 1991).  
 
Ethnomethodology ‘re-specifies’ conventional sociological topics because it turns these 
(presumed to be) already existing, stable and external ‘social facts’ into a topic of enquiry in 
their own right. It asks how do people produce those so-called ‘facts’ through their practical 
actions, reasoning and inferences as they interact with each other. Sharrock and Anderson 
(1986) think that re-specification is one of the reasons why ethnomethodology was often 
received in hostile ways and marginalised by the mainstream community of sociologists 
because it enquires into the very thing that they treat as their foundation. In other words, 
ethnomethodology ‘pulls the rug from under the feet’ of functionalism by questioning the fact-
like status of what they treated as the starting point of their analysis. Rather than presume that 
social facts exist ‘out there’ in the abstract realm we call ‘society’ (Durkheim, 1964 [1895]), 
ethnomethodology turns this into an empirical question and matter of enquiry and asks: how 
do these social facts get produced in each situation? 
 
Core concepts in ethnomethodology: Indexicality, reflexivity and the 
documentary method of interpretation 
Like other approaches, ethnomethodology comes with its own conceptual vocabulary to 
describe how it views the social world. We will now explain some of the most important and 
well-used terms. The term indexicality originates in linguistics and, within linguistics, it is used 
to refer to certain words which mean different things depending on the context that they ‘index’ 
(think of how an index in the back of a book ‘points to’ a page location) (Bar-Hillel, 1954). 
The word “they”, for instance, derives its sense from particular group that is being ‘indexed’ 
or ‘pointed to’ in that particular context. Ethnomethodology extends this by proposing that any 
social action – not just certain words but any utterance, any gesture, or indeed any kind of 
socially recognisable action – only ‘makes sense’ through inferences about what the action 
‘indexes’ or ‘points to’ in that particular context. Seeing someone contract one eyelid is a 
simple example: it can be taken to ‘index’ a (not socially meaningful) physical act of clearing 
one’s eye of debris or, when done in a particular way by a particular person in a particular 
context, can be interpreted as ‘indexing’ a (more socially meaningful) ‘wink’ that serves to 
indicate that what is going on is a wind-up, or signal some in-joke, or a make a flirtatious pass, 
and so on (Ryle, 1990; Geertz, 1973/2000). Whilst mainstream sociologists “have difficulty in 
understanding that order can arise from indexicality” (vom Lehn, 2016: 97), EM showed that 
order only arises from indexicality. Unlike for social theorists, for members of society, order 
cannot exist in the abstract.   
 
The documentary method of interpretation refers to the circular process through which every 
‘appearance’ of social action that we encounter is interpreted as ‘documenting’, ‘indexing’ or 
‘pointing to’ an underlying pattern or ‘typification’. The term typification is taken from the 
phenomenology of Schutz (1953). If we fail to supply a pattern that connects what we are 
seeing and hearing right now to the ‘typical’ social scene (i.e. what type of social actor we are 
interacting with, what their role might be, what their motives might be, and so on), the 
interaction will be impossible. Without this typification, we simply could not make sense of 
what they might be doing and how we should interact with them. Social order would break 
down. As Sharrock and Anderson (1986: 57) state, “being able to see what is really going on 
is an indispensable precondition of action, of being able to orient oneself within a social scene 
and to carry on its life”. For example, we are routinely and unproblematically able to interpret 
“How are you?” as a simple greeting that needs to be responded to with something suitable like 
“Fine thanks, how are you?” rather than a genuine enquiry into the status of our health, 
relationships, career, finances and so on because we use our common sense knowledge of that 
utterance as ‘documenting’ or ‘indexing’ a typical greeting sequence (see Garfinkel, 1967: 44, 
see also Sacks, 1975). 
 
We can think of the term appearance as referring to the “here and now” immediate scene you 
have just encountered (e.g. seeing the contraction of an eyelid or hearing someone say “how 
are you?”) and the term pattern refers to how this appearance is connected to the “larger social 
scene” (Leiter, 1980: 171). The term ‘social scene’ refers to our sense of something that is an 
enduring, typical and recurring aspect of the social world (like a norm, rule, role, motive, social 
type, and so on). The term reflexivity refers to the practices of producing accounts that both 
describe and constitute a social scene for what it is. Sharrock and Anderson (1986) explain that 
reflexivity refers not to an academic virtue (e.g. being ‘more reflexive’ about how data were 
generated and the effect of the researcher on what was said) but rather describes a fundamental 
property of accountable action, namely that “the describing of social activities is part and parcel 
of the activities so described” (p. 57). If you answer in the affirmative to the question “was that 
a promise?” you not only describe your previous speech act, you hereby fully turned it into a 
promise and you acknowledged your accountability and created future accountability. "Just as 
the accountant is accountable for his work, the everyday actor is accountable for her/his action. 
Everyday actions are accounts and accountable just like the inputting of data by accountants; 
they are "observable-and-reportable" (Garfinkel 1967: 1) actions that actors are accountable 
for, because they are visible as the producers of the action." (vom Lehn, 2016: 18) 
 
Because Garfinkel proposes that all talk and actions are indexical, that is, they depend on the 
context or setting for their meaning, it also means that this talk and action is what makes the 
setting or context what it is. Both elaborate each other. In an example discussed by Garfinkel 
and Wieder (1992), the category of the ‘abandoned car’ is constituted by members (in this case 
traffic wardens) via a distinction with the category ‘illegally parked car’. There is typically not 
one clear attribute that would distinguish one from the other; rather, once a car has been 
classified as ready to be towed away, it is then and thereby constituted as ‘abandoned’. 
Members’ methods have created the category of the abandoned car, a category that would not 
exist without these methods. “The descriptions of the social world [the accounts that we 
produce when we interact with each other] become, as soon as they have been uttered, 
constitutive parts of what they have described” (Coulon, 1995: 23). A traffic warden’s 
description of ‘abandoned’ becomes part of the scene (the car subsequently gets towed away) 
in a way that is unlike an anthropologist’s categorization of a tribe’s practice as deviant will 
remain an observer’s category and not become part of the scene.  
 
Clegg (1975) gives a fascinating example of how a group of joiners on a building site he was 
studying invoked the ‘inclemency rule’. The inclemency rule was written into their contracts 
and stated that joiners should not work in ‘inclement weather’. There was no consistent 
definition of how bad the weather had to be before it was categorised as ‘inclement’. The 
joiners invoked the inclement rule to down their tools and have a break whenever they 
determined that the weather was too bad to-continue working. Clegg showed how the common-
sense use of rules played out within the management-labour power relations on the building 
site. Ethnomethodological studies therefore have a very different approach to studying the role 
of formal rules and regulations in organizational life. The formal written contract of these 
joiners was not ‘pushing and pulling’ these men into compliance with the rules written in them. 
Ethnomethodology therefore shows “the inadequacy of formal rules and official procedures for 
capturing the detailed work that is necessary to perform competently the tasks that each setting 
poses.” (Maynard & Clayman, 1991: 405) 
 
The appearance of stability and orderliness, in everyday life as well as formal organizations of 
various kinds, is therefore built from the continuous use of member’s common-sense knowledge 
of what is happening and common-sense reasoning about what they should say or do next 
derived from their use of the documentary method of interpretation. Ethnomethodology seeks 
to identify what “stocks of knowledge” and “reasoning procedures” – or what Cicourel (1973: 
52) alternatively calls “interpretive procedures” – exist that make social organization possible. 
It “does not ask 'under what conditions would a person be caused to act?' (which is the standard 
question) but 'under what conditions does an action become recognisable and its cause (if any) 
identifiable?'” (Sharrock, 1989: 663) It therefore asks: what are these interpretive procedures 
and how do people use them to get things done? In so doing, ethnomethodological studies are 
able to show how social order requires constant, albeit largely imperceptible and predominantly 
unconscious, effort and activity. Rawls (2008: 701) refers to the “constant mutual orientation” 
to unfolding scenes of action as people seek, turn by turn and action by action, to make and 
display their sense of what is going on.  
 
Research methods used in ethnomethodological studies 
Doing an ethnomethodological study comes with some quite specific requirements for the types 
of research methods you should use, as well as particular procedures for data analysis. 
Ethnomethodological studies have a strong preference for the observation of naturally-
occurring settings or, in Garfinkel’s (1988) formulation, “locally produced naturally 
accountable” phenomena. What this means is that settings that are ‘contrived’, that is, set up 
purely for the purposes of generating data for the researcher (such as interviews, focus groups, 
experiments, questionnaire surveys) have little value because they do not give us the ability to 
recover the ethno-methods used to accomplish the organization of that setting we are interested 
in studying1. For example, if the setting in question was an organization you are studying, 
asking people about the organization in interviews or focus groups, setting up an experiment 
to replicate a situation that takes place in the organization, or designing a questionnaire survey 
to be distributed to people in the organization would all give you little insight relevant to the 
key ethnomethodological question: what are the ethno-methods through which members of that 
organization go about organizing themselves? To generate these insights, you would need to 
observe the members of the organization doing whatever job it is that they do: managing 
people, selling goods or services, coordinating logistics, collecting donations for charity, and 
so on. If you are able to get some kind of video or audio recording of the people doing their 
                                                 
1 Many of Garfinkel’s most (in)famous studies did in fact involved ‘contrived’ settings of various kinds. His 
(in)famous breaching experiments (Garfinkel, 1967: Chapter 2), where he asked his students to deliberately break 
or ‘breach’ the normal ‘rules’ of interaction, for example by asking people to clarify what they really mean or 
acting like a lodger in your own home where Garfinkel asked his students, were ‘contrived’ in this sense of not 
being naturally occurring. His infamous ‘student counselling experiment’, where students were told they were 
speaking to a counsellor who could only answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to questions they posed (which were in fact randomly 
generated), was also contrived in this sense of not being naturally occurring. However, they differ from other 
contrived researcher-designed settings informed by positivism, where conditions are controlled and variables are 
tested, because their aim was not to test the correlation of variables but rather to surface the kind of common-
sense reasoning that is normally so taken-for-granted and therefore not visible for analysis. 
 
work, this is even better. The use of recording technologies enables you to slow down the 
moment-by-moment unfolding of the interaction (including both turns at talk and non-verbal 
signals and movements) and subject it to repeated analysis by replaying the sequence and 
looking for the ethno-methods that people were using, often unconsciously and in the split-
second reaction time of an interaction, to produce social order (Llewellyn and Hindmarsh, 
2010).  
 
When people see ethnomethodological studies of interviews, such as Zimmerman’s (1969) 
analysis of interviews with welfare claimants or Llewellyn’s (2010) study of job interviews, or 
ethnomethodological studies of the collection and analysis of statistics generated from surveys 
(see Gephart, 2006), the point we just made about using observation as the primary method can 
seem confusing and perhaps even contradictory. There is an important distinction to be made 
here. Ethnomethodological researchers are interested in observing how these research methods 
and instruments (the interview, the survey, the focus group, etc.) are generated and used by the 
people who perform them as part of their normal work. The researcher is not seeking themselves 
to interview or survey people about their work, thereby generating their own interview 
accounts and survey results. Rather, the researcher is trying to find out how people who use 
interviews and surveys – or any other research method for that matter – use those methods to 
produce social reality and generate social order in whatever setting they happen to work in. For 
example, this could include welfare claim assessors using interviews in course of their work in 
a welfare agency (Zimmerman, 1969), managers using interviews to recruit candidates for a 
job vacancy (Llewellyn, 2010), or policy officials using survey statistics to formulate policy 
recommendations (Cicourel, 1968).  
 
If it is the researcher asking the questions and conducting an ‘interview’ – such as Garfinkel’s 
(1967: Chapter 5) interviews with Agnes, the intersexed person seeking sex change surgery, or 
Wieder’s (1974) informal questioning of the parolee’s in the halfway house we will discuss in 
more detail below – this interview data is also treated in a distinct way. The interview accounts 
are not treated as giving access into the reality, such as the subjective thoughts, feelings, 
attitudes and values of the person being interviewed (Rapley, 2001). Rather, they are treated as 
opportunities to tease out the methods people use for answering questions and telling stories 
that construct their social reality, albeit to a researcher rather than as part of their normal 
working lives (ten Have, 2004: Ch 4). For example, an interview account could be analysed for 
what membership categories are used or how accounts of social reality are produced as 
objective and factual (ten Have, 2004: 75), without assuming that those membership categories 
or accounts necessarily get produced in the same way in other settings (this would be an 
empirical question to be examined by studying the categories and accounts produced in those 
other settings). In this sense, interviews should be treated as accounts that can be collected by 
the researcher and added to other accounts collected as part of field research (Atkinson & 
Delamont, 2006).  
 
Issues of sampling are also considered in a different way in ethnomethodological studies (ten 
Have, 2004). It does not matter whether the social group you are studying is large or small, 
formal or informal. It could be an entire profession, an occupational group, a firm or a small 
work team that is being studied. It does not matter whether you study all the people doing that 
work activity or just a handful of those people, depending on what access you managed to 
negotiate. The key thing is that the people in the social group share, recognise and employ 
similar ‘methods’ to do whatever they do together and that you have gathered a sufficient 
number of observations of their work practice to be able to identify what these common 
methods are. In Clegg’s (1975) study of a Yorkshire building site, he simply spent enough time 
with enough workmen to be able to see and understand the ‘pattern’ through which the 
inclement weather rule was being invoked. Ethnomethodology is the study of social practices, 
not social variables, and issues of the demographic profile or roles or attitudes of the people 
you study simply do not enter the equation. If demographic categories enter the analysis (e.g. 
gender, class, ethnicity, religious belief etc.), it is through the analysis of how they are invoked 
and made relevant within the interaction by the members themselves (see e.g. Llewellyn, 2011, 
2011a). The point of an ethnomethodological analysis is to identify what shared social practices 
(ethno-methods) are being used to generate social order as the people interact, not what 
variables are making people behave the way they are behaving. As ten Have (2004: 75, 
emphasis in original) explains, “the interest is not in people as such, but in people as members, 
as competent practitioners, because ultimately ethnomethodology is interested in order-
producing practices”.  
 
As a basic methodological requirement, then, an ethnomethodological study needs to use 
observation of the setting to identify how a particular sequence of interaction is accomplished 
by observing it as it unfolds in real-time. It would also ideally be informed by deep immersion 
in the field site(s) to enable “an embodied experience of the work in question” (Rawls, 2008: 
711). Indeed, in carrying forth the ethnomethodological programme, “(r)esearchers have 
ventured into a wide range of bureaucratic and occupational settings e.g. classrooms, 
courtrooms, medical clinics, police departments, public welfare agencies, and elsewhere-to 
produce findings that are institutionally sensitive. These studies explicate the processes through 
which participants perform.” (Maynard & Clayman, 1991: 404) 
 
Such deep immersion could mean participant observation and this could quite literally mean 
training to become competent in doing the work activity in question and then actually taking 
part in the activity with those you are studying (Lynch et al, 1983: 207). This deep immersion 
is particularly important in settings where the ethno-methods are more specialised and technical 
rather than “common knowledge”. Ethnomethodologists sometimes refer to this as the ‘unique 
adequacy requirement’, in which the researcher must have “adequate” mastery of the setting 
under study “as a precondition for making ethnomethodological observations and descriptions” 
(Lynch, 1993: 274; see also Rawls, 2008; Rouncefield and Tolmie, 2012). However, some 
ethnomethodologists do not actively participate in the setting and just act as a ‘fly on the wall’, 
observing (and perhaps recording) the action as it unfolds. This works perfectly well if the 
researcher has a basic competence and “adequate” mastery of the setting already. For example, 
Llewellyn (2011, 2011a) did not need any special competence to study the selling of a charity 
magazine on the high street or people paying for admission to an art gallery.  
 
As in Llewellyn’s (2011, 2011a) study, it is also possible to collect observational data without 
being there as a researcher, just setting up a camera or recording device (or using one that is 
already there, such as the CCTV already present in the setting or audio recordings already made 
in the setting) without being physically present. There are, of course, important matters of 
research ethics to be considered with any observational study, regardless of whether the 
researcher is present and whether recording technology is used. These include how to ensure 
informed consent and how to ensure confidentiality for those observed, if such confidentiality 
is important for avoiding any harm to your participants. Signed consent and confidentiality 
forms are sometimes not possible or practical in every setting, so alternatives ways of 
protecting those you study would need to be designed, such as displaying a sign notifying 
people that a study is underway and giving them the right to withdraw from the study or receive 
further information if they are unsure about giving their consent (Llewellyn, 2011; 2011a), as 
well as giving details of how the data will be stored and used. 
 
The way that data is analysed in an ethnomethodological study is also very different to the 
types of analysis found in other qualitative approaches, again indicating “the fact there is a 
great gulf [which] typically divides ethnomethodologists from other sociologists” (Sharrock, 
1989: 660). The researcher does not try to ‘code’ the data (i.e. the observations or recordings 
of people at work) using some kind of software package that enables disparate bits of data (e.g. 
extracts from interview transcripts, fieldnotes of observations, survey responses, etc.) to be 
grouped together into a ‘code’, later to be grouped together again into higher-order codes as 
part of the abstraction of general themes or patterns from the data. Rather, the data must be 
kept within its interactional context and the patterns looked for are patterns in the interactional 
organization of the work the people are doing.  
 
There are two main ways in which cases (i.e. extracts of sequences of interaction) can be drawn 
out for analysis (ten Have, 2004). The first is single case analysis. An extended sequence of 
talk and interaction, one which is particularly important for that setting or particularly rare and 
stands out as different or unusual in some way (e.g. an exception to the norm, an unusual 
occurrence that had to be treated differently to normal occurrences) is transcribed and subject 
to turn-by-turn analysis to identify how social order was produced. The discovery of the optical 
pulsar, for example, was a one-time event and therefore suitable for a single case analysis 
(Garfinkel, Lynch, & Livingston, 1981). The second is the creation of a ‘collection’ of cases. 
For example, the analyst could gather together a collection of instances of people answering 
recruitment questions in an interview, instances of managers making recruitment selection 
decisions, instances of people making judgements about the welfare benefits that claimants 
should receive or people making policy recommendations on the basis of survey statistics. The 
analyst would use this collection of cases to identify the shared inferential practices (ethno-
methods) those people used to get their work done. 
 
Re-specifying organizations: The case of the convict code 
It would be useful to look in more detail at one particular study to show how an 
ethnomethodological perspective takes a somewhat distinct approach to conceptualising 
‘organizations’ by re-specifying them as a product of members’ interpretive procedures. 
Lawrence Wieder’s (1974) study is particularly useful for a number of reasons. Not only has 
Wieder’s study become renowned as a classic study in ethnomethodology and not only does 
his study involve a formal ‘organization’ (and hence is particularly relevant to students of 
management and organization studies), Wieder also directly contrasted his 
ethnomethodological perspective with more conventional social theory explanations to 
illustrate the difference between them. His work has also gone on to influence more recent 
ethnographies of deviant groups (see e.g. Jimerson & Oware, 2006). 
 
Lawrence Wieder’s (1974) book Language and Social Reality: The Case of Telling the Convict 
Code tells the story of his fieldwork in a ‘halfway house’: a place where recently paroled 
prisoners – in his case narcotic offenders - were sent to live for ‘rehabilitation’ before being 
released into the community. Wieder spent many months conducting non-participant 
observation in the halfway house. He informally interviewed the staff and residents about their 
behaviours and decisions, observed meetings of the various programmes and activities, 
attended staff meetings, and generally hung around in the communal areas hoping to learn 
about life in the organization from the perspective of the residents and staff. 
 
Wieder’s halfway house was a formal ‘organization’ with all its attendant matters of business 
to be accomplished. There was an official organizational goal – in this case the goal was the 
rehabilitation of narcotic offenders before being released into the community. There were 
formal rules and policies to be followed, such rules about visitors, a night-time curfew, and an 
official schedule of therapy and employment skills training for rehabilitation purposes. There 
was also a clear division of labour and distribution of roles between staff, and between staff 
and residents. There were a range of organizational decisions to be made, such as where 
residents should be allowed to go and when they were permitted release. In other words, this 
was a type of organization that required managing and organizing just like any other 
organization, whether in commercial, public sector or third sector, with its formal rules and 
structures as well as its informal sense of ‘how we do things around here’. 
 
Before starting his study, Wieder was well aware of the existing sociological and 
anthropological work that had been done on the so-called “counter-cultures” that are presumed 
to govern communities of criminals and other such deviant groups. Existing social theory 
explanations of deviant behaviour held that there exists a “moral code” that deviants followed, 
with “rules” or “maxims” such as: 
 
 Do not ‘snitch’ (i.e. inform on the deviant behaviour of other convicts) 
 Do not ‘cop out’ (i.e. admit you have done something illegal) 
 Show your loyalty to other convicts (e.g. by providing alibis or cover stories or sharing 
your drugs) 
 Do not trust officials (e.g. police, prison guards, social workers, etc.) 
 Do not be a ‘kiss ass’ (i.e. act friendly towards officials, participate in their rehab 
programs) 
 Do not be a ‘sniveler’ (i.e. complain to officials for better treatment)  
 
The traditional social theory explanation for convict behaviour goes as follows: these “rules” 
or “maxims” of the convict code are deeply-held norms and values that convicts have 
internalised through their socialization into the counter-culture and can therefore explain why 
convicts behave the way they do and predict how they will behave in a given situation. This 
traditional type of analysis is based on the idea popularised by the structural functionalist 
sociology of Parsons (1937, 1951) that rules, norms and values are external ‘social facts’ which 
are understood to ‘push’ and ‘pull’ people to behave in particular ways and thereby create the 
social order that we see in front of us: a structured world of consistent patterns of behaviour 
that gives society and social groups their ‘structured’ form. The structural-functionalist 
explanation proposes that social order is generated by the ‘rules’, ‘norms’ and ‘values’ 
purported to emanate from institutions such as the State, the education system or religion – or 
in the case of counter-cultures reactions against them - which create a structured and ordered 
society.  
 
Wieder’s ethnomethodological analysis of the convict code can be contrasted with this 
traditional structural-functionalist analysis. Wieder was interested in the methods through 
which the convict code came to be experienced as external and constraining ‘facts’. The code 
was not just something that convicts and other deviants talked about in interviews or reported 
in questionnaire surveys. The code was also something used by the residents and staff to 
interpret and explain their behaviour – both to themselves and to others. Wieder turned the 
analytic lens on himself and studied how he pieced together the various observations and 
interactions he experienced in the first days and weeks of his study, in order to assemble the 
idea of this ‘convict code’. Using the notion of the convict code he had started to learn about 
from conversations with staff and residents, Wieder used the documentary method of 
interpretation (described earlier in this chapter) to make sense of what he experienced as a 
researcher – including what he saw (from his non-participant observations) and what people 
told him when he asked them questions (in his informal interviews).  
 
For example, Wieder noticed that during the group therapy sessions, where chairs were 
assembled in a circle formation and asked to talk about their deviant behaviour and address its 
causes and propose solutions, residents would sit in an excessively slouched position (slouched 
so much that their necks would rest at the back of the chair), make little eye contact with the 
staff member, make side conversations and sometimes refuse to answer questions. Some didn’t 
even attend, despite the sanctions in place for non-attendance. These ‘appearances’ he observed 
in group sessions, he placed together in a ‘pattern’ by employing one of the maxims of the 
convict code, namely, ‘do not be a kiss ass’. This process was reflexive because:  
 
“the sense of the rules and the sense of the meaning of the patterns of behaviour are 
mutually elaborative. The code furnishes meaning for the behaviour, which, in turn, 
supplies the meaning of the code.” (Leiter, 1980: 198).  
 
This insight has profound consequences for how the researcher uses their ‘data’ to produce a 
sociological ‘theory’. It fundamentally questions the assumptions made in most traditional 
theories about causation – such as the idea that social facts (such as rules, norms or values) 
“shape our action as individuals … Social facts … are external to individuals and have a reality 
of their own” (Giddens, 2009: 13; Durkheim, 1982 [1895]). In contrast, for ethnomethodology, 
social facts such as the ‘convict code’ (or indeed any other organizational ‘variable’ for that 
matter) are viewed as interpretive devices used by members rather than as causal agents: “To 
be a causal agent … the code must be capable of being defined and recognized independent of 
context” (Leiter, 1980). As Wieder showed, the convict code did not exist independent of its 
methodical use in context.  
 
Staff members also used the convict code to make sense of events using the documentary 
method of interpretation. For example, when residents refused to give information about 
deviant behaviour of a fellow resident – such as breaking a curfew or being caught with drugs 
in their room – this ‘appearance’ was interpreted using the ‘pattern’ of the code by treating the 
refusal as motivated by the maxim “do not snitch”. The staff therefore accepted this explanation 
and did not probe further, even though they probably could and should have done in order to 
investigate violations of the official rules. Wieder’s analysis showed that the code was not only 
used retrospectively, to make sense of things that had already happened. It was also used 
prospectively as well. One of the residents, Pablo, asked to be released early on the grounds 
that a fellow convict who was about to join the halfway house suspected that he was a ‘snitch’ 
and therefore his life was in danger (retribution for ‘snitches’ was typically violent). Residents 
who gave other reasons for requests for early release, such as claiming to be experiencing racial 
harassment or having secured employment a distance away, were not granted their request. But 
Pablo was. The code was used as a reasoning procedure to anticipate future events that had not 
even happened yet. Similarly, official policies, such as policies on curfews and compulsory 
attendance at therapeutic meetings, were never put into practice on the grounds that they would 
be simply ‘unrealistic’, because the normative constraints of the code anticipated that residents 
would not comply. No such resistance or lack of compliance actually occurred, but it was 
anticipated because of their knowledge of the normative constraints of the code. Deviance from 
official organizational policies and orders was rendered ‘reasonable’ through the reasoning 
procedures provided by the code. Wieder’s study therefore neatly demonstrates the use of the 
‘informal organization’ (i.e. the convict code) as a scheme of interpretation for making sense 
of why aspects of the ‘formal organization’ (i.e. official policies) should not be implemented. 
The study also illustrates the consequential nature of ‘telling the code’. Material consequences 
arose from its use. Certain residents were released (such as Pablo), while others were not. 
Certain policies were implemented and others were abandoned as a result of the code being 
employed as a scheme of interpretation. 
 
To sum up, Wieder concluded that this so-called “counter-culture” referred to by term ‘convict 
code’ was not a stable and external set of facts and forces that somehow caused the residents 
to behave in a particular way. It was not a ‘property’ or ‘attribute’ of the social group. Rather, 
the convict code was in fact a scheme of interpretation that enabled staff, residents and 
observers such as Wieder to “organize particular behaviours into coherent, classifiable types 
of behaviour” (Wieder, 1974: 166). What Wieder’s study shows is that knowledge of the code 
enabled members to undertake the interpretive work of transforming each and every behaviour 
and utterance they encountered into the ‘application of a rule’, namely the rules of the convict 
code. The ‘business’ of this organization – namely rehabilitating narcotics offenders back into 
society after release from prison – was achieved (or at times abandoned) through this 
continuous sense-making process.  
 
Mainstream sociologists “treat order as an aggregate result of individual action in a context of 
either structurally constrained or goal-oriented activity” (Rawls, 2008: 703). In contrast, 
Wieder showed that the norms and rules of the convict code did not cause members to comply, 
as if pushing and pulling them in particular directions. In the same way, the formal or informal 
‘rules’ of business settings – such as organizational structure charts, job descriptions, strategy 
statements, codes of conduct, manuals, guidelines, and so on – do not determine what people 
do at work (Bittner, 1974). The code could not be used to explain or predict the behaviour of 
organizational members in the way a positivistic science might demand. Rather, the existence 
of this social order was created by the “methods of giving and receiving embedded instructions 
for seeing and describing a social order” (Wieder, 1974: 172). The ‘rules’, ‘values’ and ‘norms’ 
supposedly generating the orderly patterns of behaviour did not exist ‘out there’, they had to 
be continually produced by members using their stock of social knowledge in every situation 
they faced: they were “an endogenous concerted achievement” (Maynard & Clayman, 1991: 
403). It is this sense of social order being an outcome of a continuous process of interpretation 
rather than existing as a set of ‘variables’ that gives ethnomethodology its affinity to other 
process theories of organization (see Langley & Tsoukas, 2017).  
 
Conclusion 
Ethnomethodology has a special place within management and organization studies because of 
its distinct position as an alternative paradigm of social science. It is unlike most other 
approaches to studying the social world and, as such, has a lot to contribute to the study of 
organizational settings of various kinds. We hope that the reader will take away inspiration 
from this chapter and consider adopting an ethnomethodological approach in their own 
research. It might be helpful to consider in the concluding sections of the chapter the different 
streams of research through which ethnomethodological studies can contribute to our 
understanding of different forms of organization. We will consider three streams: workplace 
studies, the study of market transactions and finally a small but important body of work on 
public inquiries and official sensemaking. 
 
Since the publication of Garfinkel’s (1986) edited collection Ethnomethodological Studies of 
Work, ethnomethodologists have began to study a range of work settings under the umbrella 
term ‘Workplace Studies’. These studies have sought to reveal the methods that organizational 
members use to make coordinated action possible by interacting with each other and artefacts 
and machines of various kinds. Studies have examined the use of photocopiers (Suchman, 
1987; Orr, 1996), the design of a new technology (Button and Sharrock, 1998), air traffic 
control rooms (Suchman, 1993), London Underground control rooms and train divers (Heath, 
Hindmarsh & Luff, 1999; Heath & Luff, 2000), and CCTV operators (Neyland, 2006). This 
work has also found practical applications, for example in informing the design of human-
computer interfaces and information systems (Luff, Hindmarsh & Heath, 2000; Rouncefield 
and Tolmie, 2011).  
 
Workplace studies have produced a number of insights into how documents, graphs, charts and 
spreadsheets enable organization that future studies could advance further. Existing work has 
studied how organizational members use figures in spreadsheets (Gephart, 1988; 2006; 
Hughes, 2011), order forms (Moore, Whalen & Hankinson Gathman, 2010), formal plans and 
strategies (Samra-Fredericks, 2010; Neyland & Whittle, 2017; Whittle et al., 2016), the kinds 
of mundane artefacts used in meetings (Boden, 1994; Hughes, et. al., 2010), and paper-based 
and digital records that are routinely used in workplaces (Watson, 2009; Heath and Luff, 1996; 
Hartswood et. al., 2011). Workplace studies have had much to offer in the study of management 
processes such as leadership and decision-making. This has included work on leader succession 
(Gephart, 1978), decision-making in multi-disciplinary teams (Housley, 2003), recruitment 
decisions (Llewellyn, 2010; Llewellyn & Spence, 2009; Bolander & Sandberg, 2013), and 
senior manager decision-making and leadership interactions (Samra-Fredericks, 2000, 2003, 
2004, 2005; Iszatt-White, 2010, 2011; Whittle et al., 2015; Mueller et al., 2013). 
 
A second body of ethnomethodological work has studied market interactions where goods or 
services are being sold. Studies have examined interactions between salespeople and their 
customers (Clark & Pinch, 2010; Llewellyn & Hindmarsh, 2013), acts of charitable exchange 
(Llewellyn, 2011, 2011a) and auction houses (Heath & Luff, 2010). There is much more still 
to contribute in this area by management and organization researchers who are interested in 
how markets are created and enacted. One obvious future research opportunity is in the study 
of marketing professionals, whose day-to-day work has not been fully explored from an 
ethnomethodological perspective.  
 
A final body of work where future ethnomethodological studies would have rich insights to 
contribute is in the study of societal sensemaking. The focus here for management and 
organization researchers is not on the organization itself but rather how organizations, and the 
people who manage them, are held to account for organizational actions (in particular disasters, 
scandals and crises) through accounts produced about them and by them in different social 
institutions. Two streams of research are potential here: studies of how organizations and their 
actions are accounted for in media discourse (see e.g. Jalbert, 1999) and how they are accounted 
for in public enquiries or similar such hearings of official bodies of various kinds (see e.g. 
Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Pollner, 1987; Gephart, 1993; Lynch & Bogen, 1996; Goodwin, 1997; 
Whittle, Mueller & Carter, 2016). In doing these studies, ethnomethodology can contribute to 
management and organization studies in the same way that ethnomethodological studies have 
contributed to areas such as law, science and medicine (Maynard & Clayman, 1991: 408). 
 
End of chapter exercises 
1. What does the term ‘re-specify’ mean for ethnomethodologists and how does it change 
the way that research is done by ethnomethodologists? 
2. How do mainstream social theory explanations of deviant behaviour, which are based on 
the assumption that there exists a ‘moral code’ governing the behaviour of deviant 
groups, differ from the ethnomethodological approach used in Lawrence’s Wieder’s 
study?  
3. How do ethnomethodologists question the status of ‘social facts’ (such as norms, values, 
rules, role structures, etc.) as variables with causal properties that are amenable for use in 
positivistic social science reasoning about cause-and-effect? 
4. Try out a little experiment to establish how people create a social ‘fact’ such as a queue. 
Next time you want to join a queue in a shop, see how far away you can stand behind the 
person at the back of the queue before the person wanting to join after you asks you “are 
you in the queue?” You can try other variations of this exercise, such as facing the 
opposite direction to everyone else, standing slightly to the side, or appearing to be still 
shopping. Use this experiment to identify the ethno-methods other people use to construct 
the social reality of ‘a queue’. 
5. Next time you have a conversation with someone (ideally a close friend or family 
member where this will not adversely affect your relationship!), try leaving an unusually 
long pause when it’s your turn to talk. Then, after you have remained silent for a while, 
ask the person you are talking to how they made sense of the long pause. This will give 
you some understanding of the documentary method of interpretation they used to 
generate a meaningful ‘pattern’ or ‘typification’ to understand your strange behaviour. 
6. Think of an example where you used the documentary method of interpretation to 
establish a completely different ‘pattern’ to someone else who was also present when you 
made sense of an event (for example, a meeting you both attended). How did you create 
this different sense of social reality, using which ‘pattern’? What ‘pattern’ did they use to 
create their sense of reality? 
7. If you were to design an ethnomethodological study that involved interviews or 
questionnaire surveys, how would your research design differ from the more conventional 
social scientific research designs that employ these research methods? 
 
Glossary of key terms 
Accountable/accountability. In ethnomethodology, accounts produced by members of a 
social setting are not ‘about’ the setting but part of the constitution of the setting. Members of 
the setting work to make their scenes publicly and visibly accountable through the production 
of accounts that render them ‘real’.  
Documentary method of interpretation. The documentary method of interpretation is the 
interpretative activity through which a link is created between an event or ‘appearance’ and 
an underlying ‘pattern’ or assumed meaning structure in a circular fashion, wherein each 
elaborate the other. 
Indexicality. The idea of indexical expressions is extended from its origins within linguistics 
and in ethnomethodology refers to the notion that the meaning of all utterances and social 
actions is dependent upon a context that is supplied to make sense of it. Context, from this 
perspective, is not a fixed set of properties of the social scene but something that is brought 
into being in the moment-by-moment unfolding of the interaction. 
Reflexivity. The term reflexivity used in ethnomethodology does not refer to the forms of 
self-reflection undertaken by researchers when reflecting on their role in the construction of 
their data and findings. Rather, reflexivity refers to a property of social action, namely that 
members of a social setting understand their actions through reference to a context at the 
same time as that context is being defined through their actions.  
Re-specification. Ethnomethodology ‘re-specifies’ conventional sociological analysis by 
turning the ‘social facts’ presumed to exist ‘out there’ into a topic of empirical enquiry. It 
examines the methods that members use to create the things they take to be social facts and 
that give them their fact-like status in their moment-by-moment interactions. 
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